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Constitutionalism and the American 
Imperial Imagination 
Aslı Bâli† and Aziz Rana†† 
Constitutionalism as a legal technology for structuring state power has spread 
around the world over the last century, as a practice and also as an ideal often link-
ing the institutions of the state to commitments relating to political liberalism and 
free markets. Yet there is growing evidence that illiberal forms of constitutionalism 
may now be on the rise internationally. Some of the countervailing forces (economic 
crisis, national security threats, populism) that may limit the appeal and spread of 
liberal constitutionalism have been identified in the comparative-law literature as 
key drivers of this phenomenon. This Essay turns to a different explanation: we ex-
amine the degree to which American imperial ambitions have constituted a barrier 
to nation-state-level efforts at installing constitutionalism for reasons as varied as 
the failure of American nation-building projects and disenchantment with the pu-
tatively international liberal order led by the United States. We develop this argu-
ment with an analysis of the commitment to constitutionalism at the heart of the 
American century and its relationship to racial and economic policies pursued by 
American elites. We then trace how the international dimensions of the constitu-
tional project receded with the end of the Cold War by tracking key changes to strat-
egies of democracy promotion and multilateral governance under the Clinton, Bush, 
and Obama presidencies. Understanding the diffusion of constitutionalism and 
rule-based international governance as a means of projecting American power trans-
nationally (as a domestic prescription) and globally (as an ordering principle) ex-
poses the degree to which empire and constitutionalism have been deeply imbricated. 
By extension, we contend that the decline in constitutionalism represents a crisis in 
the articulation of American global power in the post–Cold War era. 
INTRODUCTION 
President Donald Trump’s ascendance to the White House 
has been understood as signaling a breakdown in American global 
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leadership. For some, the last year reflects the end of the 
American century; for others, the combination of the Trump ad-
ministration and Brexit suggests the demise of over two centu-
ries of Anglo-American global leadership. In short, disorienting 
developments across the Atlantic in the last year have triggered 
questions about the stability and sustainability of an interna-
tional order premised on a particular brand of American impe-
rium.1 We argue that while the Trump administration has cer-
tainly broken with the decorum and diplomacy of past American 
presidential policies, the unraveling of the international order 
put in place under American leadership in the postwar period has 
been more than a quarter century in the making. 
The postwar order that replaced the age of empires was one 
that reflected the American constitutional imagination and 
marked a break from the earlier era of formal colonial dependen-
cies. By contrast with its predecessor, the American-led order, 
grounded in constitutional principles, had two international com-
ponents. The first was a commitment to spreading market-based 
capitalist democracy and its correlate, liberal constitutionalism, 
through American bilateral and multilateral foreign policy.2 The 
 
 1 The United States today is not an empire in the traditional sense of a state that 
seeks to govern colonies directly or to assert permanent political sovereignty over foreign 
nations. Instead, as Professor John Agnew notes, American imperium is closer to the con-
cept of hegemony, in which the United States enrolls “others in the exercise of [its own] 
power by convincing, cajoling, and coercing” external players to take part in extending US 
economic and military influence. See John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global 
Power 1–2 (Temple 2005). For our purposes, what makes American hegemony “imperial” 
is the extent to which it rests on a presumptive American right of continuous intervention. 
As Professor James Tully details, US defenses of free trade and open market access, going 
all the way back to the Monroe Doctrine, have long assumed that only by entrenching 
American legal, political, and economic institutions in neighboring countries can the world 
be made peaceable for commerce and democratic self-government. See James Tully, 2 Pub-
lic Philosophy in a New Key: Imperialism and Civic Freedom 143–49 (Cambridge 2008). 
The result in practice has been constant interference to transform often non-Western so-
cieties into mirror images of the United States. Even if the United States has for the most 
part not been committed to formal global empire, twentieth-century American authority 
was nonetheless built on an imperial claim that the United States “had both a right and a 
responsibility to replace local modes of authority with institutional structures marked by 
centralized political and economic power, private property, and wage labor.” Aziz Rana, 
The Two Faces of American Freedom 286 (Harvard 2010). 
 2 See G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Re-
building of Order after Major Wars 163–68 (Princeton 2001). We assume for the purposes 
of this Essay a close relationship between liberal constitutionalism and democracy, and 
treat democracy promotion as a mechanism for the diffusion of constitutionalism. Accord-
ingly, the relationship between American empire and the spread of constitutionalism is 
related, on our account, to American democracy-promotion efforts more generally. 
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second was support for a rule-based international order that was 
understood as an extension of the American constitutional imag-
ination to the challenges of global governance. Indeed, the post-
war liberal international regime represented a clear expression of 
American constitutionalism from the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (tied eventually to an “International 
Bill of Rights”) and the UN Charter (a “constitution” for world 
order), to the creation of a tight web of interlocking institutions 
governing everything from international monetary policy and 
global trade to health, education, and scientific cooperation. As a 
consequence, the United States served as a global hegemon in a 
multilateral framework whose legitimacy depended on legality 
and a kind of international social contract that would command 
consensual participation from the international community, al-
beit in a system that still preserved asymmetric benefits for its 
author.3 And during the Cold War, as the self-styled leader of the 
“free world,” America and its commitments to legality and capi-
talist democracy were contrasted with the authoritarian control 
economies of the Soviet sphere. 
In this Essay, we explore the degree to which the version of 
American empire that characterized the postwar project has 
given way to competing commitments and preferences that have 
ultimately eroded basic faith at home and abroad in constitution-
alism itself. The Cold War period was no doubt filled with gross 
violations of international legality, antidemocratic overthrows, 
and support for American-aligned dictatorships. Indeed, in many 
ways the defining feature of American Cold War power was the 
degree to which the promotion of liberal constitutionalism in ac-
tuality produced coercion and widespread violence on the ground. 
And as we suggest below, America’s departures from its own pre-
sumptive constitutional values were in truth not defections at all. 
They were instead hard baked into the very structure of how 
American policymakers attempted to marry universal claims 
with efforts to project power, often on highly racialized terms. 
 
 3 For a discussion of the United States as the architect of a far-reaching liberal 
international order in the second half of the twentieth century, see generally G. John 
Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American 
World Order (Princeton 2011). For a more critical examination of American foreign policy 
elites’ self-presentation as authors of a liberal international order, see generally Perry 
Anderson, American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers (Verso 2015). 
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This means that the vision of American imperium that 
marked the Cold War was always an unstable one, cyclically 
breaking down under the internal weight of its own inherent con-
tradictions. But crucially, even in the context of these tensions—
such as during the Vietnam War—the persistent tendency of pol-
icymakers was to revive and defend the ideology of American im-
perium. The destructive consequences of US power were justified, 
time and again, either as aberrations necessitated by the imper-
atives of anticommunism or unfortunate transitional develop-
ments on the way to full-fledged liberal democracy. 
Perhaps most critically, despite these real and damaging con-
sequences, the requirements of offering a credible alternative to 
the Soviet example pressed American officials to invest in devel-
opmental and reconstructive efforts as well as multilateral insti-
tutions that highlighted the compatibility of the American model 
with foreign prosperity and mutual constraint. In this way, the 
default American postwar order not only remained wedded to con-
stitutional liberal democracy in its self-presentation. Especially 
during the heady postwar years of American economic largesse, 
it also embodied a plausible account both at home and abroad of 
shared economic and political security.4 
These characteristics of the postwar order were further man-
ifest in what Professor Samuel Huntington memorably framed as 
the “waves of democratization” that spread through the interna-
tional system.5 The end of World War II was marked by American 
assistance to help postfascist Western European states resurrect 
market democracies. Postcolonial independence brought a wave 
of new states that embraced constitutions—along with flags and 
anthems—as markers of self-determination.6 Joining interna-
tional human-rights treaties became a rite of passage as states 
gained sovereignty and entered the United Nations. In later 
waves, countries emerging from military rule in Latin America 
and postcommunist reforms in Eastern Europe appeared to con-
firm the transnational spread of constitutional democracy as an 
incident of American-led international order. 
 
 4 See Part I.B. 
 5 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twenti-
eth Century 15 (Oklahoma 1991). 
 6 See generally Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab 
Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government (SUNY 2002). 
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This meant that for all the profound violence and real democ-
racy demotion of the Cold War years, liberal constitutionalism as 
a “default design choice”7 did diffuse broadly in the decades fol-
lowing World War II. While this earlier era of democratization 
depended on many factors, this diffusion was facilitated, on our 
account, by the background conditions of multilateral order and 
the presentation of constitutional democracy as the legitimate do-
mestic political order for countries maintaining good standing in 
the American-led “free world.” Although it was viewed as a sys-
tem without ideological competitors by the end of the Cold War, 
this seemingly “default” framework nonetheless depended on 
American commitments that underwrote the postwar interna-
tional order. While the decline of liberal constitutionalism may be 
tied to numerous factors, the gradual American retreat from its 
own international and domestic model has surely played a role. 
During the Cold War, American leaders commonly regarded 
the constraints of international institutions as conducive to en-
trenching the nation’s hegemony. But with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the fact of unipolarity seemed to remove many of 
the external pressures that had previously connected national 
self-interest to international legal restraint.8 Moreover, in the ab-
sence of an alternative model as a foil against which the United 
States proclaimed its democratic commitments, other strategic 
priorities gained salience. In particular, counterterrorism and 
the national security state became increasingly central to Amer-
ican governance imperatives. In the very regions where American 
analysts awaited the arrival of a “fourth wave” of democracy—
notably the Muslim world—these new imperatives not only dis-
placed constitutional priorities but were in many cases in direct 
tension with them.9 
Certainly, during the Cold War there had always been a ten-
sion between democratization and anticommunism, leading to the 
 
 7 Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal 
Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 239, 239 (2018). 
 8 For the classic statement of the argument in favor of international institutions as 
a means of extending American hegemony, see generally Robert O. Keohane, After Hegem-
ony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton 1984). For an 
argument that the post–Cold War era presents different challenges that are less bound to 
resolution through international institutions, see generally Charles Krauthammer, The 
Unipolar Moment, 70.1 Foreign Aff 23 (1990). 
 9 See Stephen R. Grand, Starting in Egypt: The Fourth Wave of Democratization? 
(Brookings, Feb 10, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/RH4Q-96QG. 
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support of pliable dictatorships.10 But in the post–World War II 
years, such support was presented as transitional or as still 
bound to a narrative of shared economic growth that would in 
time generate liberal democratic regimes. However, with the 
Muslim world styled as an incubator of terrorist threat and a gen-
eral American retreat from the domestic and international wel-
farist policies that marked the early Cold War, the United States 
increasingly moved simply to consolidate executive power 
abroad.11 This consolidation persisted without any plausible ac-
count of political transition or collective economic improvement—
and despite half-hearted invocations of “democracy promotion.” 
In essence, the Cold War’s coercive security means became in-
creasingly disconnected from any credible aspirational ends. 
In some ways, the Trump administration represents the 
apotheosis of these broad international and transnational trends. 
The Cold War era had been marked by a persistent cycle in which 
American policymakers elaborated a framework of constitutional 
values and norms only to see those norms break down in political 
practice. But the post–Cold War era culminating in Trump has 
now seemingly ended the cycle. It has produced a final collapse of 
commitment to the values themselves and, thus, of the basic jus-
tifications for American imperium.12 At the domestic level, the 
president shows little deference to constitutional norms at 
home—decrying judicial independence when it undermines exec-
utive fiat13 and setting aside long-standing practices in areas 
ranging from conflict-of-interest rules to the treatment of the 
White House press corps.14 On the international front, Trump en-
tered office announcing a determination to withdraw from key 
 
 10 See Thomas Carothers, A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy, 18 J Democ-
racy 112, 112 (Oct 2007) (“In the 1980s, democracy aid had to struggle to become some-
thing more than just a side element of anticommunist security policies.”). 
 11 See id at 114. 
 12 In the memorable formulation of Stephen Wertheim, Trump may be “the first pres-
ident to take office who explicitly rejects American exceptionalism.” Stephen Wertheim, 
Trump and American Exceptionalism (Foreign Affairs, Jan 3, 2017), archived 
http://perma.cc/LVH9-3R45. 
 13 See, for example, Amy B. Wang, Trump Lashes Out at ‘So-Called Judge’ Who Tempo-
rarily Blocked Travel Ban (Wash Post, Feb 4, 2017), online at http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-lashes-out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked 
-travel-ban (visited Dec 12, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 14 See, for example, Donald Trump: A List of Potential Conflicts of Interest (BBC, Apr 
18, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/376P-PTB6; Mathew Ingram, Turmoil in the White 
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American commitments in multilateral agreements from NAFTA 
to the Paris Climate Agreement, proposed to slash funding to the 
State Department and other domestic agencies with foreign policy 
or foreign aid responsibilities, called into question the country’s 
commitment to NATO, and evinced a pronounced hostility to the 
United Nations.15 Trump has also expressed disdain for projects 
of nation building and promised to cut support for American for-
eign policy programs designed to advance democracy abroad.16 
While Trump’s intemperate behavior is clearly unusual, his 
boastful unilateralism is not. The post–Cold War period, from the 
Clinton administration through the Obama administration, has 
more often been characterized by departures from the rule-based 
order of twentieth-century international institutions than sup-
port for them.17 In this sense, events of the last year reflect an 
accumulating momentum decades in the making rather than the 
eccentricities of an accidental president. A slow trickle of defec-
tions from earlier multilateral commitments by the United States 
has gathered into a tidal shift, reducing the coherence and stabil-
ity of liberal constitutional design as a default internationally and 
transnationally. Thus, to understand the continuities between 
Trump and earlier administrations requires an appreciation for 
the complex role liberal constitutionalism and American excep-
tionalism have played in both creating and undermining an inter-
national social contract premised on US hegemony. 
Over the following pages, we lay out this argument in 
greater detail, emphasizing how as the domestic creedal commit-
ment tying constitutionalism back to America’s founding narra-
tive came under pressure domestically in the post–Cold War era, 
its imperial correlates—capitalist democratization and a rule-
based international ordering principle—began to lose support. We 
view this as an explanation for the decline in the spread of liberal 
constitutionalism that is consistent with and indeed underlies 
 
House Press Corps Plays into Trump’s Hands (Fortune, Mar 14, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/RZ6Z-9V5C. 
 15 See Mark Agrast, No Ordinary Time *2–3 (ASIL, Jan–Mar 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5AFY-BAZZ. 
 16 See Thomas Carothers, Democracy Promotion under Trump: What Has Been Lost? 
What Remains? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sept 6, 2017), online at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/06/democracy-promotion-under-trump-what-has 
-been-lost-what-remains-pub-73021 (visited Dec 12, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 17 See Part II.A. 
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other hypotheses in the literature, but one that remains underap-
preciated. We begin with an analysis of the commitment to con-
stitutionalism at the heart of the American century and its rela-
tionship to racial and economic policies pursued by American 
elites. We then trace how the international dimensions of the 
constitutional project receded with the end of the Cold War by 
tracking key changes to strategies of democracy promotion and 
multilateral governance under the Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
presidencies. Understanding the diffusion of constitutionalism 
and rule-based international governance as a means of projecting 
American power transnationally (as a domestic prescription) and 
globally (as an ordering principle) exposes the degree to which 
empire and constitutionalism have been deeply imbricated. By ex-
tension, we contend that the decline in constitutionalism repre-
sents a crisis in the articulation of American global power in the 
post–Cold War era in which international order has been re-
framed around a Global War on Terror. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 
The American post–World War II vision of global order pulled 
together a set of arguments that had been percolating among pol-
icymakers and political elites for the first half of the twentieth 
century. In this Part, we highlight how with the United States’ 
emergence onto the global stage, the language of constitution-
alism became central to justifying external power and to ex-
plaining the presumptive distinctions between American and 
European imperium. We also emphasize the manner in which 
constitutionalism creatively married notions of universal inclu-
sion and self-government with racial hierarchies about global 
stewardship—even during the era of decolonization. Finally, we 
explore perhaps the great paradox of the Cold War: how American 
constitutionalism embodied a credible global model that was at 
the same time constitutively linked on the ground to practices of 
violence and lawlessness. 
A. Constitutionalism as the Principle of American Power 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, elites who favored an 
aggressive American role abroad had long found themselves fac-
ing a basic dilemma. Policies, ranging from participating in World 
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War I to engaging directly with European power politics to es-
tablishing a permanent peacetime security infrastructure, all 
faced intense internal opposition and seemed to contradict long-
standing isolationist and antimilitarist sentiments. In particular, 
they cut against popular assumptions that foreign entanglements 
as well as the creation of a large professional military would in-
evitably undermine republican institutions and self-government. 
Indeed, a classic tenet of nineteenth-century American foreign 
policy held that isolation from Europe and its internecine con-
flicts sustained domestic tranquility. None other than Alexander 
Hamilton had famously argued in Federalist 8 that the barrier of 
the Atlantic Ocean offered Americans an “insulated situation”18 
that did more than anything else to preserve domestic security. 
These established ideas raised significant popular doubts 
about the legitimacy of enhanced American interventionism. In 
response, defenders of greater international authority began—
against the backdrop of American militarism in the Philippines, 
the Americas, and especially during World War I—to intertwine 
new foreign policy commitments with an account of the federal 
Constitution in national identity. Such political elites increas-
ingly placed the Constitution at the center of American exception-
alism and viewed the document and the domestic culture it pro-
moted as an implicit justification for emerging American 
hegemony. 
According to this view, the feature that most distinguished 
the American political project from old-world Europe was the 
Constitution. Whereas European communities were the product 
of feudalism as well as political and religious absolutism, the 
Constitution highlighted the extent to which the American ex-
periment had been built from its founding on an effort to fulfill 
Enlightenment principles. As David Jayne Hill, Republican Party 
stalwart, ambassador to Germany, and president of Rochester 
University, wrote in his 1916 book, Americanism: What It Is, the 
federal Constitution above all “developed here in America a new 
estimate of human values, and this has led to a new understand-
ing of life.”19 Contrasting European monarchical despotism with 
American commitments to liberty and self-government, Hill de-
clared that the American colonists sought to “prevent forever the 
 
 18 Federalist 8 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 44, 49 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). 
 19 David Jayne Hill, Americanism: What It Is viii (D. Appleton 1916). 
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recurrence of absolutism in every form, whether official or popu-
lar, whether of dominant individuals or of popular majorities,” 
thereby producing the “original and distinctive contribution of the 
American mind to political theory . . . that there should be nothing 
in government that is not governed by law.”20 In effect, Hill and 
others mapped out an early twentieth-century variation of what 
Professor Nikhil Pal Singh has called “American universal-
ism”21—namely, the idea that what marks out the United States 
as exceptional is its status as the place where Enlightenment 
commitments truly took historical root. 
At stake in such claims was more than the belief that the 
Constitution safeguarded liberties at home. It also upheld the 
view that the Constitution spoke to a special mission abroad. Ac-
cording to Hill, European powers sought to divide the world ac-
cording to a principle of “imperialism”22 and thus treated other 
communities as little more than material spoils. Given these 
facts, a peaceful and stable international order required a strong 
American presence. This was because the culture of American 
constitutionalism was “antithetical to Imperialism, whose watch-
word is unlimited power”23 and thus offered a necessary counter-
balance on the global stage. Supposedly in opposition to empire, 
the constitutional principle meant that American authority was 
centrally about creating the conditions in foreign, oftentimes non-
European, societies for peaceful self-government. With the world 
consumed in global conflict and instability, the United States 
had a responsibility to ensure that the principle of constitution-
alism, rather than that of imperialism, dominated the interna-
tional order.24 
By the 1940s, the war with Nazi Germany and the growing 
confrontation with the Soviet Union pushed these arguments 
 
 20 Id at 27. 
 21 See Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for 
Democracy 17–18 (Harvard 2004) (“‘American universalism,’ historian John Higham sum-
marizes, is ‘our egalitarian ideology . . . molded by the Enlightenment and forged in the 
revolution . . . simultaneously a civic credo, a social vision and a definition of nationhood.’”). 
 22 Hill, Americanism at 179 (cited in note 19). 
 23 Id at 134. 
 24 Id at 223–24: 
When the American people have had time to realize the character and extent of 
the emergency our age is called upon to meet—and the moment for action admits 
of no delay—their decision cannot be doubtful. The call to duty may require sac-
rifices, but we shall be a nobler people for making them. 
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linking constitutionalism, tutelage, and American power to the 
political center. In justifying American involvement in World 
War II, those in the Roosevelt administration focused on the 
perceived cultural and political differences between the United 
States and the country’s collectivist or totalitarian foes. In par-
ticular, commentators and policymakers once more rallied 
around the claim that the United States had been defined from 
the Founding by neither race nor religion, but rather by a civic 
faith in fundamental rights, the rule of law, and basic equal-
ity—Enlightenment principles that they argued made the coun-
try the first truly universal nation. As the editors of the nascent 
liberal journal, Common Ground, declared in the fall of 1940: 
Never has it been more important that we become intelli-
gently aware of the ground Americans of various strains have 
in common; . . . that we reawaken the old American Dream, 
a dream which, in its powerful emphasis on the fundamental 
worth and dignity of every human being, can be a bond of 
unity no totalitarian attack can break.25 
The Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal offered perhaps the 
most seminal popular presentation of these ideas in An American 
Dilemma, a formative text on race relations and American iden-
tity for mid-twentieth-century political elites. Myrdal contended 
that the Constitution embodied what he called “the American 
creed”26 and through the text “the nation early laid down as the 
moral basis for its existence the principles of equality and lib-
erty.”27 Myrdal argued that, although racist and archaic practices 
may have continued to persist in pockets—or entire regions—of 
the country, these practices were incompatible with national val-
ues. “The main trend” in American history was “the gradual real-
ization of the American Creed.”28 So pure were the country’s 
 
 25 Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century 193–
94 (Princeton 2001). 
 26 See generally Gunnar Myrdal, 2 An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy (Harper & Row 1969) (originally published 1944). Myrdal contended 
that “American civilization early acquired a flavor of enlightenment which has affected 
the ordinary American’s whole personality” and generated a creedal commitment to “lib-
erty, equality, justice, and fair opportunity for everybody.” Gunnar Myrdal, 1 An American 
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy lxx, lxxii (Harper & Row 1969). 
 27 Myrdal, 2 An American Dilemma at 1021 (cited in note 26). 
 28 Id. 
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founding motives that America could be seen, at its core, as noth-
ing less than “humanity in miniature.”29 
Myrdal, along with many Cold War policymakers influenced 
by American Dilemma, employed these creedal arguments to then 
call for a postwar order premised on American preeminence. Pre-
cisely because the United States was a nation founded on plural-
ism, tolerance, and the rule of law—embodied concretely in the 
Constitution—American power internationally stood “warm-
heartedly against oppression in all the world.”30 Given that the 
country’s constitutional values expressed the global community’s 
ideals, pax Americana necessarily involved a defense of liberal 
goals against illiberal threats. Such creedal constitutionalism 
thus gave an account of the justness of American security prerog-
atives and provided the ideological foundations for the “American 
Century.” 
Yet, for all the claims about the opposition between American 
constitutionalism and European imperialism, it is essential to ap-
preciate the extent to which these notions of American exception-
alism rested on background judgments about racial hierarchy and 
nonwhite dependence. In the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the figure that best embodied this interconnection was none 
other than President Woodrow Wilson, liberal internationalist 
and domestic segregationist. Wilson viewed the world as divided 
into distinct ethnocultural “peoples” at different stages in the pro-
cess of political evolution.31 European Americans, especially of 
Anglo-Saxon descent, stood at the forefront of this evolution, due 
to their long-standing acculturation in the practices of republican 
freedom. While democratic self-government was a universal good 
and all peoples had the potential eventually to enjoy its benefits, 
only those who had reached political maturity were ready in the pre-
sent. “Only a long apprenticeship of obedience can secure” less de-
veloped peoples “the precious possession” of real self-government, 
Wilson stated, “a thing no more to be bought than given.”32 
Precisely because the United States had supposedly reached 
the end stage of ethnocultural development—and was not stained 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Woodrow Wilson, The Place of the United States in Constitutional Develop-
ment, excerpted in W. Cameron Forbes, ed, 2 The Philippine Islands 511, 511–12 
(Houghton Mifflin 1928). 
 32 Id at 512. 
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by the absolutism and internecine violence marking Europe—it 
had a unique global role to play in shepherding less developed 
peoples on the path to freedom. In effect, emerging accounts of 
American universalism, grounded in constitutional experience, 
reaffirmed rather than undermined white American supervision 
and interventionism. Indeed, for this very reason, regardless of 
American self-presentation the new American imperium often 
echoed the old European variety. This is perhaps best illustrated 
by publishing magnate Henry Luce’s own famous call in 1941 to 
“create the first great American Century.”33 For Luce, Americans 
enjoyed a right to global dominance because they were nothing 
less than “inheritors of all the great principles of Western civili-
zation.”34 In this way, even the language of exceptionalism vis-à-
vis other empires placed US elites and policymakers in a long line 
of European officials, officials who too justified their nation’s 
global power based on special cultural attributes and historic des-
tiny. And perhaps most important for those on the receiving end 
of American power in the first half of the twentieth century, the 
new politics of US global authority could seem awfully similar to 
its European rivals. 
Critically, even in the post–World War II era of decoloniza-
tion, the linking of a constitutionally grounded American univer-
salism with racial hierarchy did not recede. Indeed, it remained 
essential to justifying the expanding Cold War politics of perma-
nent global interventionism. This is most powerfully underscored 
by how Wilsonian ideas about ethnocultural peoplehood and 
stages of political development morphed into perhaps the most 
dominant discourse of early Cold War foreign policy: moderniza-
tion theory. Modernization theorists, both in the American social 
sciences and in government, routinely described the world as on 
a relatively linear path from traditional to modern society.35 
While modern societies combined liberal-democratic constitution-
alism with economic growth, urbanization, and high educational 
attainment, traditional societies, as historian Nils Gilman notes, 
were understood to be “inward looking, inert, passive toward na-
ture, superstitious, fearful of change, and economically simple.”36 
 
 33 Henry R. Luce, The American Century, 23 Diplomatic Hist 159, 171 (1999). 
 34 Id at 170. 
 35 See Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War 
America 1–3 (John Hopkins 2003). 
 36 Id at 5. 
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Moreover, the totality of the non-European world was generally 
described as “traditional” with the United States depicted as the 
ideal historical end point of modernity.37 
Not surprisingly, this linking of constitutionally grounded 
American universalism and racial hierarchy meant that global 
security and progress required reconstituting defeated powers 
and newly postcolonial states on American institutional terms. 
First, it emphasized the centrality of constitution writing, in 
Japan, Germany, and elsewhere, as part of the projection of 
American influence. This was because spreading American influ-
ence entailed spreading the political-legal forms of American do-
mestic society, especially those seen as conducive to pluralism, 
understood in terms of Madisonian checks and balances. Second, 
it also entailed promoting the idea of constitutionalism itself as a 
global international principle. And the heart of constitutionalism 
was not merely formal legal texts, but above all a commitment to 
legal restraint and collective decisionmaking. Hence, in con-
structing postwar institutions, American policymakers from 
both political parties focused especially on the proliferation of 
multilateral international legal regimes to govern virtually every 
issue of global significance.38 
B. Violence, Constraint, and Shared Prosperity in the 
American Cold War Model 
The long-term result was the establishment of a very partic-
ular governing global order and Cold War vision, one framed 
around constitutional fidelity as well as American exceptionalism 
and international hegemony. It also, paradoxically, led to a re-
markable quality of Cold War politics: the extent to which pro-
moting liberal constitutionalism abroad actually required—as a 
matter of sustained practice—subverting local self-determination 
on the ground. If anything, one can tell the story of the Cold 
War—with its history of overthrows and political assassina-
tions—as governed far more by American lawlessness than by le-
gal restraint. 
 
 37 Id at 5–6. 
 38 See Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan at 182 (cited in note 3) (“As Stewart Patrick sug-
gests, ‘One reason that multilateralism was so compelling to the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations was that it resonated with the liberal political culture that form[ed] the 
core of American national identity.’”). 
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This was for two interrelated reasons. First, policymakers 
persistently argued that American violations of the constitutional 
principle were the product of the existential threat posed by the 
Soviet Union.39 This threat was of such a scale that in some cir-
cumstances it required fighting the violence of the Soviet sphere 
with the counterviolence of coups, assassinations, and covert op-
erations.40 Elites conceived of these practices as highlighting the 
ethical bind facing the United States, an exceptional nation forced 
against its own actual preferences to employ dirty political means 
in a world of violence and disorder. Indeed, the very discomfort 
Americans supposedly experienced with this harsh reality further 
underlined the specialness of the national project—it spoke to the 
extent to which the country was fundamentally moral in its own 
ends and self-understanding.41 
But alongside this argument from political necessity was a 
second claim grounded in judgments about ethnocultural limita-
tions. Following modernization theories, scholars and officials of-
ten argued that the great threat to transition from traditional to 
modern society in the Third World was too hasty an embrace of 
populist majoritarianism. As Gilman notes, American policy-
makers worried, against the backdrop of economic underdevelop-
ment, that mass democratic pressure could lead to the “patholog-
ical” form of modernity epitomized by the Soviet Union.42 Given 
this alternative, autocrats who served internally as stewards of 
 
 39 See, for example, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards 
(Commentary, Nov 1, 1979), online at http://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/ 
dictatorships-double-standards (visited Dec 12, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 40 For a comprehensive account of how American officials, perceiving existential 
threat, used guerrilla tactics and fought terror with “counter-terror,” see generally 
Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, 
and Counter-Terrorism, 1940–1990 (Pantheon 1992). 
 41 It was just this tendency of Cold War elites to engage in self-absolution—by focus-
ing on the perceived justice of the country’s ends—that so worried Reinhold Niebuhr about 
the direction of American foreign policy in the 1950s. Despite being a “cold warrior” him-
self and an ardent critic of the Soviet Union, Niebuhr in 1952’s The Irony of American 
History emphasized the messianic consistencies between Soviet and American ideologies. 
American identity may have been grounded in the idea that it “knew nothing of sin or 
guilt,” but its actions—like using nuclear weapons against Japan and potentially using 
them again—could be morally grave. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History 39 
(Charles Scribner’s Sons 1954). Under these circumstances, for the United States to con-
tinue to “believe[ ] itself to be peculiarly innocent” was at best a dangerous illusion and at 
worst a threat to the world. Id. 
 42 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future at 14 (cited in note 35). 
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modernization—promoting property rights, literacy, and tech-
nical and administrative expertise even if they constrained polit-
ical liberty—facilitated the preconditions for mature liberal de-
mocracy. All of this meant that during the Cold War, American 
lawlessness in practice was systematically presented as either ab-
errational or the product of the ethnocultural immaturity of 
newly independent states in the non-European world. 
What made such arguments plausible to many elites—both 
within the United States as well as abroad—was that American 
police power went hand in hand with a credible story of global 
betterment. The specter of the Soviet Union not only justified in-
terventionist violence, it also created the need for an achievable 
account of shared prosperity. Although the Soviet Union was not 
nearly as wealthy as the United States, it offered a clear example 
in the post–World War II years of an impoverished state that had 
rapidly industrialized. Indeed, this example better approximated 
the particular circumstances across war-torn Europe and post-
colonial Asia and Africa than did American economic and political 
history.43 And it led American social scientists and policymakers 
to argue, in the words of Professor Max Milliken (head of the 
Center for International Studies at MIT), that “[t]he best counter 
to Communist appeals is a demonstration that these same [devel-
opment] problems are capable of solution by other means than 
those the Communists propose.”44 
All of this meant that American Cold War policymakers rec-
ognized the need for international multilateral institutions to pro-
vide tangible material benefits and highlighted to them the link 
between global constitutionalism and shared economic pro-
gress. This was most obviously underscored by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, which imagined a multilateral and rule-
bound framework to manage the global economy, and by the 
European Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan. 
Both were organized on the principle that the United States as 
the dominant economic power should guarantee a global financial 
system aimed at promoting reconstruction and development and 
premised on the free flow of American capital. Although this cer-
tainly allowed American corporations to penetrate, often exploi-
tatively, new markets, it also was tied to a conscious desire to 
 
 43 See id at 43. 
 44 Id. 
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produce practical economic achievements that could be juxta-
posed against the Soviet alternative.45 
The result was a remarkable tension in American Cold War 
imperium. On the one hand, the high tide of the Cold War saw 
American direct involvement or complicity in truly staggering 
forms of mass violence across large swathes of the world, epito-
mized most obviously for the domestic audience by the war in 
Vietnam. In this way, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that 
American constitutionalism as the principle of global power, ei-
ther in terms of the political-legal institutions promoted abroad 
or the overall multilateral international order meant to govern 
economic and security policy, systematically produced illiberal-
ism and lawlessness. And as anticolonial critics often contended, 
such illiberalism seemed undergirded by the persistence of racial-
ized notions of cultural capacity.46 
Yet at the same time, even for many elites in the Third World, 
the American example remained alluring. To begin with, elites 
from Turkey to India to Indonesia often internalized judgments 
about traditionalism and modernity and so accepted underlying 
and fundamentally racialized development narratives about the 
path to prosperity.47 But more critically, both the example of a 
growing American economy and the commitment of US policy-
makers to invest in multilateral economic and security institu-
tions sustained faith that American imperium could actually lift 
all boats. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously said of 
the importance of financial and technical support for the Third 
 
 45 Id at 36–38. 
 46 It was for this reason that Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton in their sem-
inal statement of black radicalism, Black Power, emphasized the logical continuities be-
tween the justifications for American global power and specific US support for apartheid 
regimes like South Africa. As they declared of both the inherent racial tendencies of 
American imperium and of the importance of black activists to develop their own inde-
pendent foreign policy to contest that of the national security state: “It seems inevitable 
that this nation would move to protect its financial interests in South Africa, which means 
protecting white rule in South Africa. Black people in this country then have the respon-
sibility to oppose, at least to neutralize, that effort by white America.” Stokely Carmichael 
and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America xi (Random 
House 1967). 
 47 As just one example, General Suharto’s authoritarian regime in Indonesia, 
marked by spasms of genocidal violence in the mid-1960s, was largely justified by local 
elites both internally and to the international community on developmental grounds 
regarding what “accelerated modernization” required politically. See generally Brad 
Simpson, Indonesia’s “Accelerated Modernization” and the Global Discourse of Develop-
ment, 1960–1975, 33 Diplomatic Hist 467 (2009). 
274 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:257 
 
World, which ultimately led to the establishment of the US 
Agency of International Development (USAID), the goal was to 
“use material means to a non-material end.”48 For Acheson, the 
ultimate aspiration was a global community of liberal-capitalist 
states, constitutionally governed and committed to providing for 
the basic social welfare of its citizens. This vision gave both pur-
pose to American power and had real appeal as a viable model, 
even if it went hand in hand in practice with political coercion or 
economic extraction. 
II.  THE BREAKDOWN IN CONSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
The end of the Cold War produced hopes that the bipolar 
standoff that had paralyzed much of the postwar international 
security system centered on the United Nations would give way 
to a new era of multilateral cooperation under American leader-
ship. The new unipolar moment would be one in which the prin-
ciples America had sought to project through the Cold War—
democratic governance in domestic political systems and multi-
lateral rule-based order internationally—might now be fully real-
ized.49 Moreover, high levels of defense spending in the United 
States and among its allies could now be reinvested in social pro-
grams, paying a peace dividend and enabling new spending on de-
velopment and governance goals. The promise that American-led 
international order would deliver stability, economic prosperity, 
and political liberty seemed finally within reach. 
Instead, the next quarter century witnessed a series of defec-
tions from multilateralism by the United States, acting largely 
uncontested, and an initial period of expansion was followed by a 
decline in the spread of constitutionalism and democracy as do-
mestic models of governance. In the place of a peace dividend, the 
1990s witnessed the dismantling of what remained of the social 
welfare state and the emergence of patterns of capital mobility 
and capital flight that later came to be identified with predatory 
globalization. The resulting record has been one of a slow unrav-
eling of multilateral ordering principles coupled with a profound 
crisis in both the plausibility and perceived legitimacy of the 
American-backed international order. As American imperial ad-
ventures have rewritten rules governing international security, 
 
 48 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future at 71 (cited in note 35). 
 49 See Krauthammer, 70.1 Foreign Aff at 29 (cited in note 8). 
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yawning inequalities generated by market capitalism and the 
failure of its nation-building projects on the ground have also tar-
nished the appeal of American-branded models of democratic gov-
ernance. At the same time, competing models of governance—
particularly of managerial authoritarianism—may be gaining 
traction over the logic of liberal constitutionalism.50 
In this Part, we review the history of the post–Cold War pe-
riod to examine how and why American international and trans-
national commitments unraveled in the absence of the Soviet foil. 
Critical to this account is a shift in the American approach to con-
stitutionalism. As we have argued, in the Cold War context, the 
United States routinely defected from constitutional commit-
ments for instrumental reasons or as part of arguments about 
“developmental” dictatorships, but it treated such defections as 
aberrational or transitional. In the post–Cold War period, we con-
tend that the United States has defected from constitutionalism 
not simply as a means to realize competing priorities, but because 
of a deeper ambivalence and indeed fundamental drift in basic 
global vision. If anything, as underscored by the Global War on 
Terror, what is noteworthy about the present moment is that the 
old coercive means of Cold War security policy have persisted but 
now occur disconnected from previous aspirational ends. 
A. From New World Order to Unilateral Exceptionalism 
President George H.W. Bush proclaimed the birth of “a new 
world order”51 led by the United States in the wake of the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Echoing ideas of the United States serving as 
an enlightened hegemon—a view that came to dominate policy-
making in the mid-twentieth century—there was a hope that the 
spirit of the Marshall Plan would animate American-led efforts to 
assist Eastern European transitions. At the same time, a newly 
strengthened UN Security Council would use its enforcement 
powers to deter threats to international peace and security. In 
some ways, the 1991 Gulf War was seen as evidence of the con-
struction of such an order with the Security Council authorizing 
intervention to deter aggression by an erstwhile American ally. 
 
 50 See, for example, Brahma Chellaney, The Challenge from Authoritarian Capital-
ism to Liberal Democracy (China-US Focus, Oct 6, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/96SX-MFKF. 
 51 George Bush, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union (American Presidency Project, Jan 29, 1991), archived at http://perma.cc/GRV7-DE7C. 
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Yet enthusiasm for an intervention to liberate Kuwait gave way 
to concerns about the enforcement of no-fly zones seemingly with-
out clear authorization and the imposition of a sanctions regime 
with punishing consequences for civilians.52 
In fact, the Gulf War may be remembered as marking a high 
point of post–Cold War international cooperation in the authori-
zation of collective action. But its aftermath—and the Clinton ad-
ministration’s approach to “muscular diplomacy” with selective 
reliance on international frameworks—was far more telling for 
the international order coming into focus in the 1990s. Despite 
rhetorical commitment to multilateral ordering principles, the 
Clinton administration set a series of precedents that signaled 
American ambivalence toward internationalism and a willing-
ness to act unilaterally without regard for those principles. 
Examples of instances in which the “new world order” gave 
way to an American disengagement include the American re-
sistance to signing the Land Mines Convention, the reluctance to 
sign the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), and the military campaign in Kosovo.53 In this same 
period, international-law scholars identified a new trend among 
American policymakers and academics that came to be described 
as the “New Sovereigntists.” One scholar studying this form of 
rising anti-internationalism described its adherents as “re-
sist[ing] the incorporation of international norms and drap[ing] 
the power to do so in the mantle of constitutional legitimacy,” 
which allowed the government to “pick and choose the interna-
tional conventions and laws that serve its purpose and reject 
those that do not.”54 This approach—“internationalism à la 
carte”—provided cover for the Senate’s rejection of the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty, the US failure to submit the Kyoto 
Protocol for Senate approval, and the failure to accede to the 
 
 52 See, for example, Ewen MacAskill, Second Official Quits UN Iraq Team (The 
Guardian, Feb 15, 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/5A8Y-H3MS (noting that UN “sanc-
tions against Iraq suffered a new setback yesterday after another high-ranking official 
was reported to have resigned in protest at the suffering of the civilian population”); No-
Fly Zones: The Legal Position (BBC, Feb 19, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/9PZA-GJAS 
(noting that “unlike the military campaign to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the no-fly 
zones were not authorised by the UN”). 
 53 For a critique of Clinton-era unilateralism along these lines, see Jed Rubenfeld, 
Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 NYU L Rev 1971, 1980–81 (2004). 
 54 Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False 
Prophets, 79 Foreign Aff 9, 9 (Nov–Dec 2000). 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child.55 In many of these in-
stances, the United States participated in negotiations and 
helped shape the regimes that it subsequently rejected.56 
Unilateralism in this period also included American use of 
force without international authorization. President Bill Clinton’s 
decision to bomb Sudan in response to al-Qaeda attacks against 
US embassies elsewhere in Africa suggests that “the preemptive 
and unilateral use of U.S. military power was [already] per-
ceived as necessary prior to [George W.] Bush’s election.”57 An-
other Clinton-era doctrine, that of identifying and seeking to iso-
late or impose sanctions on “rogue states,” also exemplified a 
preference for selectively referencing international frameworks to 
justify far-reaching coercive policies. One scholar notes that the 
“rogue states” doctrine best encompasses the Clinton approach to 
international security questions due to its “lack of status in inter-
national law, its declaratory and unilateral nature, its rooting in 
a realist calculus of US interests, [and] its articulation in terms 
of a ‘warning to enemies.’”58 
With respect to the hope that the post–Cold War “new world 
order” might give rise to a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe, the 
investment that did arrive took the form of aggressive privatiza-
tion policies backed by the World Bank rather than the earlier 
New Deal–inflected social-welfarist approach.59 In many ways, 
the turn to privatization was the product of American domestic 
developments that had emerged during the latter part of the Cold 
War itself. By the 1970s, the early postwar order was showing 
profound signs of strain. Economic crisis, social rebellion, and the 
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 56 See generally, for example, Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz, and Guri Bang, Why the 
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 57 Melvyn P. Leffler, Bush’s Foreign Policy, 144 Foreign Pol 22, 24 (Sept–Oct 2004). 
 58 John Dumbrell, Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton’s Foreign Policy 
Reconsidered, 13 Diplomacy & Statecraft 43, 55 (June 2002). 
 59 See, for example, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: 
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1992) (arguing that the “need to accelerate privatization is the paramount economic policy 
issue facing Eastern Europe”). 
278 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:257 
 
costs of military failure in Vietnam together generated deep sus-
picions among emerging elites in both parties regarding the very 
economic viability of social welfarism. Beginning during the 
Carter administration (and becoming common wisdom under 
President Ronald Reagan), blame for ongoing crises was laid 
squarely at the feet of a supposedly bloated government and a 
corrupt labor movement. Politicians and economists turned to the 
market and to policies of market liberalization as the solution to 
all manner of social ill.60 It was not a surprise, then, that by the 
1990s what the United States exported abroad was “shock ther-
apy” rather than a global New Deal. 
The post–Cold War results for Eastern Europe and elsewhere 
were dire to say the least. Rapid privatization led to massive 
transfers of public wealth into private hands and the ensuing cor-
ruption and inequality that still mark much of the region from 
Russia to Hungary.61 A perhaps equally important result was that 
the attachment of the model of constitutionalism to prescriptions 
of privatization and market liberalization produced a Beltway 
consensus that tied liberalism to what many Eastern Europeans 
experienced as rapacious forms of capitalism. 
In a sense, these developments embodied an obvious continu-
ity with the Cold War connection between capitalist property ar-
rangements and liberal constitutionalism. But recall again that 
at least during the early Cold War, the social-welfarist principles 
of American economic policy seemed plausibly to tie American 
economic interest and foreign development. “Shock therapy” 
highlighted that as Keynesian and welfarist commitments de-
clined in the United States, especially after the 1970s, the promo-
tion of aggressive privatization was no longer tied to actual ma-
terial improvements overseas. The development formulas that 
were embraced as part of the new consensus—in structuring 
economies and requiring rule-of-law and governance reforms—
largely failed to produce either market-based prosperity or stable 
 
 60 See generally, for example, Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last 
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 61 See, for example, Peter Rutland, Mission Impossible? The IMF and the Failure of 
the Market Transition in Russia, 25 Rev Intl Stud 183, 190 (Dec 1999). Professor Peter 
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political order among recipient states.62 Austerity and wealth 
transfers ran directly against social needs and the almost talis-
manic focus on these among US policymakers as the only viable 
economic options created a defense of austerity almost for its own 
sake. On the one hand, Clinton-era unilateralism produced a 
precedent in places like Kosovo for American-led coalitions to use 
force without legal authorization that presaged over fifteen years 
of continuous war since 2001. On the other hand, policy prescrip-
tions for the post–Cold War transitions in Eastern Europe and 
beyond tied political liberalization to privatization and markets 
in ways that associated constitutionalism with neoliberal econom-
ics—but pointedly not with actual shared material betterment.63 
The Bush administration doubled down on the unilateralism 
and neoliberal policy prescriptions of the Clinton administration 
while shedding any rhetorical defense of multilateralism. The 
first few months of the Bush administration signaled a further 
retreat from multilateral engagements with the abrogation of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, the “unsigning” of the 
Rome Statute, the repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, and opposi-
tion to a draft UN convention to reduce small-arms trafficking.64 
Professor Harold Koh described these and other examples, includ-
ing the apparent repudiation of the Geneva Conventions, as evi-
dence that the United States had established itself as part of an 
“axis of non-obedience.”65 The disengagement from multilateral-
ism even extended to areas in which international cooperation 
had been a long-standing priority, such as policies regarding nu-
clear nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
The Bush administration distanced itself from the disarmament 
commitments within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), repudi-
ated commitments made by the United States at the 2000 NPT 
 
 62 For a compelling discussion of the harm wrought by the development strategies 
backed by the Washington consensus in Africa, see generally William Easterly, The Tyr-
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Books 2013). 
 63 See Joshua Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and 
the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government 59 (Yale 2013) (“[E]conomic change 
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Review Conference, and welcomed India’s development of nuclear 
technologies, eventually concluding a civil nuclear deal with the 
NPT nonsignatory country.66 In lieu of multilateral agreements 
like the NPT, the Bush administration developed a flexible ad hoc 
coalition, the Proliferation Security Initiative, with a narrow 
agenda and scope of activities involving coercive interdictions of 
suspected proliferation activities, without international legal au-
thorization.67 Even as the Bush administration went to war in 
Iraq over WMD concerns, it weakened the frameworks designed 
to deter WMD proliferation. 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the combina-
tion of catastrophic threats, resurgent nationalism, and the sus-
pension of most of the remaining legislative checks on the admin-
istration’s conduct of its foreign policy, resulted in an open 
embrace of preemption and unilateralism that is best exemplified 
in the United States’ 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS).68 
For the rest of the world, the NSS represented a doctrine of un-
fettered use of force and an embrace of “preventive” war-making.69 
This approach extended the earlier “rogue state” doctrine by ref-
erence to the threats of WMD and terrorism to a new “Axis of 
Evil.”70 In the place of the “new world order” proclaimed by his 
father and characterized by multilateral cooperation, the younger 
Bush sought to create a selective antiterrorist alliance as part of 
his declaration of a Global War on Terror. 
In some ways, especially when considered through the prism 
of the Iraq war, the Global War on Terror seemed to reboot many 
familiar elements of Cold War policy. Officials at times combined 
a Manichean good-versus-evil worldview with classic Cold War 
claims about the capacity of American stewardship to transform 
 
 66 See Patrick, “The Mission Determines the Coalition” at 41 (cited in note 64). See 
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traditional and violence-prone Muslim societies into modern lib-
eral capitalist nation-states. The Iraq war, in particular, was pre-
sented as an opportunity to liberate the population from retro-
grade authoritarianism and to establish a democratic model for 
the Middle East. But the failure of the Iraq war quickly collapsed 
American expectations of a “domino effect” of democratization in 
the region as well as the credibility of figures within the Bush 
administration who emphasized the old transformative account 
of American power.71 
Indeed, the debacle of the Iraq intervention and the devastat-
ing sectarianism and civil conflict that followed definitively dis-
connected the Global War on Terror from any modicum of liberal 
aspirations. Instead, familiar Orientalist tropes concerning the 
Muslim world’s irreducible cultural resistance to modernity increas-
ingly gained dominance.72 In this way, previous racial hierarchies 
persisted in shaping American policy, but only now disconnected 
from any faith in progressive and emancipatory change. Instead, 
a racialized conception of Muslims as implacably hostile to the 
West underwrote practices of containment in which counterter-
rorism amounted to pacification, with very little of substance to 
offer besides the stability of a police state. 
The Global War on Terror was so broadly conceived that it 
produced a potentially indefinite armed conflict on what could 
easily become a global battlefield against a nebulous set of foes 
comprised of nonstate actors and their alleged state sponsors.73 
The combination of the arguments proffered to authorize the 
Iraq intervention and the conduct of the Global War on Terror 
in Afghanistan led some to worry that American exceptionalism 
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and unilateralism had become a threat to a rule-based interna-
tional order and undermined the legitimacy of international law 
and international organizations.74 
The Global War on Terror brought into focus an international 
order in which American exceptionalism was no longer tied to a 
commitment to rule-based presumptions. International-law 
scholarship turned to theorizing the “state of exception” to 
make sense of the United States’ systematic repudiation of ex-
isting legal limits under its new counterterrorism framings.75 
While American unilateralism was certainly not unprecedented, 
the abandonment of the rhetorical commitment to law signaled a 
retreat from the defense of the multilateral institutions that had 
been constitutive of US global governance strategy since the 
end of World War II. At least one distinguished American 
scholar of international law read this change as representing a 
“system abrogation.”76 
B. Bush, Obama, and the Failure of the “Fourth Wave” 
The American rejection of constitutionalism as the central 
principle of the international order provided the broader context 
for the decline itself of liberal constitutionalism as a general 
model. As the United States shifted focus to counterterrorism pri-
orities, it reduced its funding for democracy, human-rights, and 
governance programs while the focus of remaining funds often 
centered on shoring up the security sector among recipients.77 The 
slowing spread of constitutionalism is also tied to a set of expec-
tations concerning democratization in the postcolonial world that 
did not materialize. As the Cold War ended, Professor Huntington 
declared that a “third wave” of democracy had characterized the 
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final quarter of the twentieth century, spanning Latin America, 
the Asia-Pacific region, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan 
Africa.78 At the turn of the twenty-first century, there was much 
anticipation of a “fourth wave” of democratization affecting the 
Muslim world in particular.79 Yet the Global War on Terror cast 
the United States in oppositional terms to much of the Muslim 
world, even if the Bush administration was at pains to claim that 
it was not at war with Islam as such. The centrality of the Muslim 
world as an incubator of terror in the Bush paradigm put paid to 
the idea of democracy promotion.80 Indeed, racialized presump-
tions about the risks attendant to democracy in the Muslim 
world—where free elections might empower political Islam—
placed a fourth wave at odds with realizing counterterrorism 
goals. Ultimately, the Global War on Terror displaced the fourth 
wave in framing a future trajectory for Muslim-majority states. 
The Bush administration’s antiterrorist alliance not only de-
parted from existing international legal constraints on coercive 
force, but also encouraged its allies to do the same. The prohibi-
tion on torture and arbitrary detention quickly gave way around 
the world to practices of extraordinary rendition and secret de-
tention to facilitate coercive interrogation. Moreover, as the legal 
sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele observed, the Global War on 
Terror was transformed into “an international state of emergency 
that requires other countries to make exceptions to both interna-
tional law and their constitutional orders.”81 The spread of liberal 
constitutionalism, once viewed as the inevitable correlate of the 
end of the Cold War, was now supplanted by other priorities. The 
Bush administration replaced the language of democracy with an 
emphasis on “moderation,” especially among its antiterrorism al-
lies in the Muslim world.82 Further, the need for allies among 
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countries bordering Iraq and Afghanistan meant outright democ-
racy demotion where geostrategic interests so required.83 
The Global War on Terror also precipitated failed American 
efforts to translate belligerent occupation into imposed constitu-
tionalism domestically in Iraq and Afghanistan.84 Two key attrib-
utes of American efforts to install constitutionalism in these coun-
tries tarnished the broader model of liberal constitutionalism. 
First, constitutionalism was identified quite literally with impe-
rial imposition. By undertaking constitution-drafting exercises 
under conditions of occupation and using constituent assemblies 
appointed under the supervision of a foreign occupying force, the 
United States tarred constitutionalism with the brush of collabo-
ration. Second, the resulting political systems failed to deliver the 
most basic requirements of effective governance, such as channel-
ing the competition for power through electoral institutions or es-
tablishing a state capable of exercising a monopoly on force. In 
short, American-style imposed constitutionalism was viewed in 
much of the Middle East and the Muslim world as both normatively 
unappealing and functionally flawed.85 The sheer management 
competence and economic performance of alternative models—
particularly the East Asian managerial authoritarianism identi-
fied with Singapore and China86—would have much to recom-
mend it against a backdrop of corruption, state violence, and lack 
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of basic services that characterized American nation-building exer-
cises, with billions of dollars spent in ultimately futile bids to 
shore up failing constitutional orders. 
The credibility of managerial authoritarianism as an alterna-
tive model became even more pronounced following the 2007 
global financial crisis precipitated by decades of deregulation and 
the predatory lending policies that were rampant under the Bush 
administration. The recession that followed the crisis laid bare 
the racialized impact of rapacious capitalism at home87 while 
devastating the economies of numerous countries tied to the 
American-led international financial order. The result was an in-
ternational loss of faith in market-driven American economic 
stewardship, given the centrality of the American banking sector 
in generating and magnifying the global recession. And in exem-
plifying the failure of the American approach to provide actual 
material prosperity, the recession further compounded the declin-
ing appeal of the country’s constitutional model. 
In fact, to the extent that Chinese foreign investment strate-
gies held on to elements of the American economic model, China’s 
delinking of governance from democratic imperatives spoke to the 
viability of an alternative that offered stability without constitu-
tional corollaries.88 At a deeper level, as illustrated by a decade of 
Chinese investment in Africa, Chinese managed authoritarian-
ism highlighted the fundamentally contingent relationship be-
tween market capitalism and liberal constitutionalism.89 Man-
aged authoritarianism need not be thought of as transitional; 
market capitalism and liberal constitutionalism were not neces-
sarily wedded to one another—neither in the present nor in the 
eventual future. 
Just as important, for the first time in decades, the financial 
crisis also systematically punctured faith in market-based solu-
tions within the United States. Policymakers had been promoting 
these strategies abroad and failing to deliver results, but that rec-
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ord of incompetence had not reverberated at home. Now even in-
ternal elites and domestic publics came to question the value and 
legitimacy of these projects.90 The definitive abandonment of 
Keynesian policies in the middle decades of the Cold War gave 
way to prescriptions that immiserated populations on the receiv-
ing end of American development aid. Eventually, the domestic 
equivalent of these policies produced a crisis at home about the 
relationship between democracy and unregulated capitalism. 
Following the bellicosity and unilateralism of the Bush ad-
ministration, the election of President Barack Obama rekindled 
international hopes that the American brand of constitutionalism 
could still result in competent leadership and commitment to rule-
based international order. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to 
Obama within less than a year of his election was perhaps the 
clearest example of this hope. The Nobel committee cited Obama’s 
promotion of nuclear nonproliferation and his fostering of a more 
constructive climate for international relations through outreach 
to the Muslim world as the basis for awarding him the Prize.91 
Yet Obama showed a marked ambivalence toward multilat-
eralism, and while he softened the rhetorical approach taken by 
the Bush administration, he extended the preference for ad hoc 
coalitions over multilateral institutions. One of his earliest en-
gagements with nuclear policy, for example, was not an effort to 
shore up the NPT but rather the convening of a Nuclear Security 
Summit in April 2010 that was a meeting of an ad hoc and infor-
mal coalition of forty-seven states to enter into voluntary commit-
ments relating to safeguarding nuclear materials within their 
borders.92 The Obama administration also continued policies of 
forgoing participation in the ICC and the Ottawa Treaty (on land 
mines) and treating multilateralism instrumentally through a se-
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lective policy of international cooperation when it suited geo-
strategic objectives.93 While Obama restored some measure of 
American reputational legitimacy, he also preserved the asserted 
American prerogative to use force in counterterrorism operations 
around the world. As drone strikes extended to US citizens 
abroad, some argued that the American license to kill in the 
Global War on Terror was undermining not only rule of law as an 
international matter but also basic constitutional constraints 
within the United States.94 
The discretionary unilateralism of American drone strikes 
was mirrored by an increasing reliance on unilateral executive 
action domestically under the Obama administration. As partisan 
polarization crippled the ability of the administration to pursue 
policy preferences with legislative cooperation, Obama found 
himself relying on theories of inherent executive power to govern. 
For example, rather than seek congressional authorization to 
take part in a coalition bombing campaign in Libya, Obama em-
ployed a Justice Department opinion supporting his unilateral 
authority to make the determination to join the war in Libya.95 
Critics argued that he was continuing the Bush-era practice of 
using politicized legal advice to evade constitutional constraints 
and forge an imperial presidency.96 Just as with its predecessors, 
the new administration had seemingly allowed the short-term 
policy payoff of unilateralism both internationally and domestic-
ally to obscure the long-term costs of undermining basic rule-of-
law values. 
The Libya intervention looked much like Iraq by 2012—a 
regime-change military intervention producing chaos and violence 
rather than the promise of democratization and constitutionalism. 
Moreover, by the end of Obama’s second term, American constitu-
tionalism itself may have looked less like a model than a problem. 
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Obama’s last years in office were largely characterized by parti-
san dysfunction and rule by executive orders, as signature policy 
achievements were increasingly accomplished through unilateral 
action.97 The concentration of power in the American executive 
became a new basis for authoritarians around the world to invoke 
the US constitutional example in favor of their own practices.98 
Obama also exhibited little appetite for returning to democ-
racy promotion.99 Indeed, the Arab uprisings were met, to the dis-
appointment of many scholars, with a renewed emphasis on mod-
eration.100 Once constitution-writing exercises began in Egypt and 
Tunisia, they won tepid support that fell away, again, when a mil-
itary coup brought a new authoritarian to power in Egypt.101 Else-
where, Obama showed the same proclivity for favoring charis-
matic leaders over political liberalization as his predecessor.102 In 
Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai prolonged his increasingly 
authoritarian rule over Afghanistan with US support through the 
first six years of Obama’s presidency. It was no doubt the case 
that the Obama administration’s wariness about nation-building 
and democratization efforts reflected clear lessons drawn from 
the Bush administration’s misadventures. But the problem was 
that as the United States continued to actively intervene in coun-
tries from Libya to Afghanistan, its actions combined aggressive 
attacks on established state institutions with thin commitments 
to reconstruction. The results, unsurprisingly, were quite dim for 
democratization and constitutionalism in the region. 
Under Bush, American detention and interrogation practices 
undermined the prohibition on torture and allowed dictators to 
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point to the US example in defending their own human-rights rec-
ords.103 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, hyperpartisanship, 
and a spotlight on racial inequalities in the United States under 
Obama, America’s brand of constitutionalism itself came to be as-
sociated with political and economic dysfunction.104 And across 
both administrations American interventionism undermined 
the case for democracy. The Trump administration’s slogan of 
“America First” augurs a ratcheting up of unilateralism and na-
tivism in the United States that will do little to restore confidence 
in America’s willingness to adhere to rule-of-law principles inter-
nationally. Nor will the American record of democracy demotion 
do much to shore up liberal constitutionalism abroad as the basic 
features of the model are called into question domestically by 
President Trump.105 In this sense, at least, the character of 
America’s contemporary imperial ambitions represents an in-
creasing constraint on the global appeal of constitutionalism. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, what we have argued in the preceding parts is 
that the most common way of thinking about the relationship be-
tween constitutionalism and empire fundamentally misunder-
stands how American power has operated during and after the 
Cold War. The tendency of scholars is to imagine these as opposed 
categories, or at least in tension, with the collapse of the consti-
tutional principle creating the conditions in domestic and inter-
national life for discretionary imperial ambition. But what these 
arguments fail to appreciate is the extent to which constitutional 
ideology and the twentieth-century rise of pax Americana have 
been deeply interpenetrated. Indeed, constitutionalism may well 
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be understood as the definitive language of American interna-
tional police power and primacy. This means that discourses of 
constitutional commitment have been a critical foundation for 
justifying and expanding the sphere of American influence. It also 
means that the current decline in the appeal of constitutionalism 
speaks to a crisis in the articulation of American global power. 
Again, none of this is to say that constitutionalism actually 
systematically constrained security excess at home or abroad dur-
ing the peak of American Cold War identity. In fact, as discussed 
earlier, constitutionalism was a central ideological tool in the ser-
vice of both foreign intervention and the expansion of the state’s 
national security infrastructure. Constitutionalism was the defin-
ing language and legitimating ideology of American violence. Ex-
ceptionalist discourses and constitutional attachment were rou-
tinely leveraged not just to defend particular foreign adventures, 
but also to underwrite the overall justness of a growing security 
apparatus and global military footprint. This was because, for 
Cold War political elites, preserving constitutional values—given 
the presumption about international instability and Soviet 
threat—required projecting American power and safeguarding 
the constitutional state from all perceived dangers wherever they 
may occur. 
In this way, constitutionalism and American global hegem-
ony are perhaps best seen as operating in tandem and giving sus-
tenance to one another. Moreover, this suggests that rather than 
aberrations from the constitutional ideal, the modes of violence 
and rights violation that were endemic to Cold War American im-
perium were essential to the policymaking vision itself—despite 
talk to the contrary of hypocrisy or political necessity. Still, it is 
key to appreciate how the creedal and constitutional presentation 
of the country nonetheless gave ethical meaning and purpose to 
American power. It may have sanctioned coercion, but it also es-
tablished the terms for what responsible global action consisted 
in (multilateralism as well as transnational promotion of democ-
racy, economic development, and constitution writing) and it pro-
vided a language both within the United States and internation-
ally about why American authority—whatever the destructive 
implications—might be legitimate. 
Thus, what distinguishes that earlier period of American im-
perial ambition from the present is not primarily about means or 
security practices. The Global War on Terror and the Cold War 
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were both marked by racialized logics and heightened degrees of 
violence. It is rather that the US retreat as a matter of basic prin-
ciple from its own organizing frameworks has generated an impe-
rial politics devoid of coherent justification. When the current 
president refuses to recognize a qualitative or ethical distinction 
between American and Russian politics and voices on both the left 
and right emphasize accelerating economic inequality and de-
cline, we have reached a point at which it is no longer merely for-
eign critics or domestic dissidents that challenge the idea that 
American power is exceptional, constrained, or necessarily tied to 
shared material prosperity. These presumptions, and with them 
the link between empire, constitutionalism, and market-based 
growth that shaped the Cold War imagination, have become so 
eroded that they seem increasingly unsustainable even as a mat-
ter of internal self-perception. 
Perhaps this is most typified by the fact that whatever 
“model” defines the Trump presidency, President Trump and 
those around him hardly seem to be political innovators. Rather, 
as numerous commentators have noted, the Trump administra-
tion appears to be riding a wave of resurgent right-wing populism, 
from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the Philippine 
President Rodrigo Duterte, and so drawing from a well-worn 
global authoritarian playbook.106 This inversion, whereby ruling 
elites import authoritarian repertoires in place of the American 
exceptionalism they once projected, has profound implications. 
On the one hand, there is no doubt that constitutional logics pro-
vided a cover for acts of security violence at home and abroad. But 
on the other hand, it is nonetheless true that these logics also 
provided the conceptual language to challenge those very prac-
tices as hypocritical and to undergird the basic institutions of a 
multilateral global order. To the extent that the appeal both for 
US policymakers and foreign actors of American-styled constitu-
tionalism is in decline, this means that American power itself 
faces a clear crisis in legitimacy. The point is not that American 
economic or military might will simply disappear or recede before 
other global competitors. But rather, as the basic logics justifying 
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American power break down, the question of why the United 
States should enjoy preeminence becomes ever more acute. 
The global community finds itself subject to the whims of a 
preeminent state power whose principal actors have step-by-step 
over the last three decades seemingly lost clarity about that 
state’s objectives and overarching global vision. If the American 
imperial project—as an expression of American exceptionalism 
and constitutional commitment—seems less and less plausible, 
the question is what will take its place. In a sense, the global com-
munity now encounters a moment of increased political openness, 
with real uncertainty about what will fill the vacuum. 
The pessimistic worry is that for all the many flaws of consti-
tutional imagination, if a future order is premised ideologically 
on the United States’ or some other state’s raw power, the space 
for self-constraint and rule-based limitations will continue to re-
cede. But that is not the only possibility. There may also be new 
space for alternative orderings to emerge in an international sys-
tem defined by multipolarity or one in which numerous competing 
hegemons dominate their own regional spheres. As the aspira-
tional ambitions of an American-led liberal international order 
recede, so too do the legitimating frames that have often served 
to validate or obscure acts of real violence. Trump’s ascendance 
has made plain the nature of what has for decades been the 
American orientation to the world, an orientation guided by ne-
oliberal commitments, national security presumptions, and uni-
lateral coercion. The silver lining may be that in the absence of 
credible American global leadership, other powers or global civil-
society movements, acting singly or in concert, may yet embrace 
the aspirational potential of a new international order. Although 
such an order might not speak the language of American consti-
tutionalism, it also might not be weighed down by US geostrategic 
constraints and coercive imperatives. 
